Lecture Notes: Japanese Internment
· Executive Order 9066 singed by Roosevelt on 19 February 1942 forced
120,000 Japanese-ancestry persons into 10 internment camps [26,000 Japanese-Canadians
were interned]
· they represented more than the population of the Five Civilized
Indian Tribes who were moved to OK in the 19th century
· only Japanese-Americans on the West coast, NOT in HI, were interned!
· 66% were US citizens (Nisei)
· 33% were Japanese-born (Issei), who could not be US citizens
· US justification: "military necessity" -- unsupported allegations
of disloyalty
Many Germans and Italians were also interned, including US-born citizens
and "aliens" (legal immigrants) of these two nationalities.
Background
· 1880s US wanted cheap labor: Asian were imported
· by 1908, 135,000 Japanese had arrived
· Oriental Exclusion Proclamation (1907) limited Japanese immigration
· 1924, US prohibited Japanese immigration and barred those that had
entered from becoming US citizens
· US lifted ban in 1952 Organization of Camps
· many camps built on Indian reservation lands
· US Supreme Court argued (7 to 2 vote) that camps were justified
for military/security reasons
· guards called them "Japs"
· "interns" built, maintained all buildings, and produced their own
food
· surrounding towns were hostile: Parker, AZ, barber shop sign: "Jap,
keep out, you rat."
· Chief of Police of Los Angeles, where 33% of Japanese-Americans
lived, said:
"You have racial characteristics, that of being a Mongolian, which cannot
be obliterated from these persons, regardless of how many generations are
born in the US."
Patriotism
· by 1944, 1,500 Japanese-American men from the camps volunteered
for military service
· fighting in Italy for freedom that their parents and relatives did
not have in USA
· very high casualty rates compared with other ethnic/racial groups
· one of the most heavily decorated units in US military history
Resistance
1) Japanese-American themselves
· 6,000 young people renounced their US citizenship
· 5,000-8,000 returned to Japan after the war
2) Groups Supported Japanese-American Rights
· Socialist Party, especially its head, Norman Thomas
· American Friends Service Committee
· Workers Defense League
· Post War World Council
· ACLU
Restitution and Remembrance
1) 2 January 1945 US Supreme Court: ruled that detention camps were unconstitutional
- yet in Hood River, OR, the American Legion erased the names of Nisei in
the armed forces from the town's Honor Roll
2) 1948 Truman signed "Japanese Evacuation Claims Act"-- claims were made:
$131 million; only $38 million was paid (used 1942 value of the dollar)
3) 1981 US Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians
· in 1988, US officially apologized in the Civil Liberties Act --
first time in US history
· compensation: $20,000 (not taxes) for each living survivor of the
camps (if dead, then their spouses or children)
· 60,000 former internees were entitled to payment when Reagan signed
law (60,000 x $20,000 = $1.2 billion -- the Civil Liberties Public Education
Fund was authorized for $1.25 billion)
· no payment has been made yet: 16,000 are 70 years and older and
are dying at 200/month
· in 1942 prices, estimated total lost in property and income: $2
billion
4) National Park Service Historic Site (established in 1992): Manzanar -
Manzanar held 10,000 internees; 80% from southern CA - in the desert of the
Owen Valley, CA
· Manzanar site today: - small cemetery with a monument - two stone
guard houses built by internees - an auditorium - everything else gone of
one square mile camp & 36 blocs of barracks · Park Service justification
for park: ". . .reflection of America as a nation made up of diverse ethnic
and racial groups. All of these groups, not just a chosen few, should be
included in the story of our national heritage." * now the salad bowl metaphor,
and not the melting pot metaphor, is used
5) annual pilgrimage, especially large at the 50th anniversary of Manzanar
in 1992, by Japanese-American and others to keep alive this injsutice.
6) war memorial in Washington, DC (established in 2001) for the Japanese-American
soldiers who served in World War II while their parents were interned.
U.S. constitutional issues involved in the internment of Japanese-Americans:
due process -- must be accused of a crime and have broken a law, before being
charged.
innocent until proven guilty -- not jump to conclusions about criminal behavior
before due process has been completed.
upholding bill of rights -- regardless of circumstances and the kinds of
people involved.
upholding the equal protection clause of the U.S. constitution -- fighting
discrimination & racism individually; and in private & public institutions.
ATOMIC WEAPONS
The Use of Atomics on Japan
- With the end of the European war, the Allies focused their efforts on Japan.
Japan still fought fanatically, despite being badly hurt by bombing and blockade.
- The Potsdam Proclamation, which demanded the unconditional surrender of
Japan, was issued. It made no mention of Japan's central surrender condition:
the status of the Emperor. Japan rejected the Proclamation.
- The Japanese believed the Emperor to be a god (this is a key point).
- The U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Russia declared
war against Japan.
- Japan, because of its military, still refused to surrender.
- Japanese peace advocates, fearing the imminent destruction of the Emperor,
prevailed upon the Emperor to break with tradition and make government policy
by calling for peace now. The Emperor did so.
- As the result of the Emperor's call for surrender, the entire Japanese
cabinet, including the military, agreed to surrender. The cabinet saw that
this would allow the Emperor to be retained.
- Even Japan's doves would have fought to the death had they not felt the
Emperor would be spared. They saw "unconditional surrender" as a threat to
the Emperor.
- President Truman had been advised of the importance of the Emperor to the
Japanese.
- Japan was seeking Russia's help to end the war in July 1945. The U.S. was
aware of this at the time thru intercepted Japanese cables. But the U.S.
did not keep up with this change in Japan's position.
- The U.S. chose military methods of ending the war rather than diplomatic
methods. The desire for revenge helped make military methods more attractive.
- We probably could have ended the war sooner with fewer deaths on all sides
by using the full carrot and stick: 1) offer retention of the Emperor for
a quick surrender; and 2) threaten Russian invasion and 3) atomic destruction
as the alternative. None of these key incentives to surrender were used prior
to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.
- Had the above method failed, and had the Russian invasion failed to bring
surrender soon, the atomic bombs were still available - but as a last resort.
- After the atomic bombings, Japan was allowed to retain their Emperor, anyway.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were also not targeted because of their industrial
importance, however. Contrary to the "Interim Committee" recommendation that
the bomb be targeted at an important industrial facility surrounded by workers'
houses, at Hiroshima most major industry was known to be outside the designated
target area.
Few analysts have noticed that the Interim Committee recommendation was not
actually followed. In fact, the way in which the bombing was planned--and
carried out--specifically avoided significant war plants. The subject came
up at the Target Committee meeting of May 28--and, as the minutes show:
Dr. Stearns presented data on Kyoto, Hiroshima and Niigata and the following
conclusions were reached:
not to specify aiming points, this to be left to later determination at base
when weather conditions are known.
to neglect location of industrial areas as pin point target, since on these
three targets such areas are small, spread on fringes of cities and quite
dispersed.
to endeavor to place first gadget in center of selected city; that is, not
to allow for later 1 or 2 gadgets for complete destruction.
Subsequently the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey also confirmed that "all major
factories in Hiroshima were on the periphery of the city--and escaped serious
damage. . . ."
The Target Committee also recommended on May 31, 1945, "that we should seek
to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants
as possible." The goal was essentially to show that the bomb could destroy
a whole city.
A grateful nation, hopeful that this new weapon will result in the saving
of thousands of American lives, feels a deep sense of appreciation for your
accomplishment.
- To the annual Gridiron Dinner on December 15, 1945 he explained that at
the time he made the decision to use the atomic bomb:
It occurred to me that a quarter of a million of the flower of our young
manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities, and I still think they were
and are.
- On April 6, 1949 the president told a group of new Democratic senators
and representatives that he
made that decision because I thought 200,000 of our young men would be saved
by making that decision, and some 3[00,000] or 400,000 of the enemy would
be saved by making that decision.
- On April 28, 1959 Truman told students at Columbia University simply that
"the dropping of the bombs stopped the war, saved millions of lives”